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SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE FOR THE ACQUISITION AND 
PRESERVATION OF WIRELESS NETWORK TRAFFIC 
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Wireless networking provides a ready and cost effective solution for business applications. It has escalated in 
popularity mainly due to the ability to form computer networks without a wired based infrastructure. However, 
accompanying the widespread usage also comes the inherent prospect of criminal misuse, including 
unauthorized application and the launch of system attacks. This paper presents the testing of an innovative 
Wireless Forensic Model (WFM) system that provides capability for acquisition and preservation of wireless 
network traffic (802.11) frames by implementing a wireless drone architecture. It is thus a forensic readiness 
system providing available evidence for forensic investigation. The results show that the tested system has the 
ability to collect upwards of 90% of all frames, as well as evidence and detection of attacks conducted against 
the wireless network. 
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
Wireless networking has become both a ubiquitous and an increasingly popular communications technology 
providing access and services for computing devices not physically connected to a network infrastructure. With 
the release of the IEEE 802.11 standard, and the subsequent availability of supported devices, Wireless Local 
Area Networking (WLAN) has grown to be one of the most globally accepted wireless networking standard. 
Such universality is due to the flexibility of the network, the extension of Local Area Networks (LAN), and the 
facility of high speed internet access to wireless clients (Varshney, 2003). However, accompanying the 
widespread usage also comes the inherent prospect of criminal misuse including unauthorized application and 
specific attacks conducted against WLANs (Slay & Turnbull, 2006). Since the communications medium is 
conducted over open airwaves it also remains available to possible intruders, creating a high risk factor and 
making it a logical equivalent to an Ethernet port in a parking lot (Karygiannis & Owens, 2002).  
The 802.11 security features have been subjected to extensive scrutiny and a number of risks identified. These 
include, the weakness of the original Wired Equivalency Protocol (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) 
network encryption attacks (Bittau, Handley & Lackey, 2006; Beck & Tews, 2008), as well as the potential for 
Man in the Middle (MITM) and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (Frankel et al., 2007). Associated with the 
vulnerability and misuse of wireless networks is the availability of consumer devices and software tools that can 
be easily obtained for conducting the identified attacks.  Hence, it is certain that wireless systems will be 
compromised. The consequence is that systems ought to be readied for forensic investigation and examined for 
the forensic capability as well as the implementation of security features. 
The paper is structured to review the literature and theoretical background to WLAN architectures, define the 
possibilities of alternative architectures for forensic benefit and to report the findings of testing an alternative 
architecture. The proposed Wireless Forensic Model (WFM) system architecture and drone components are 
defined with reference to information gathered from the literature. The system will be implemented and 
benchmark testing conducted to assess the capabilities of the design. Common WLAN attacks will then be 
recreated to evaluate the capabilities of the WFM to provide viable digital evidence. The paper concludes with a 
short review of issues and problem areas 
WIRELESS FORENSICS 
The overall digital forensic procedure can be defined as “the application of science to the identification, 
collection, examination and analysis of data while preserving the integrity of the information and maintaining a 
strict chain of custody for the data” (Kent et al., 2006). Wireless forensics is a unique area of digital forensics 
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and has combined characteristics from both computer and network forensic methodologies (Yim et al., 2008). 
Traditional computer forensics usually involves extracting data from the storage medium of a device, such as a 
hard drive from a Personal Computer (PC); while network forensics encompasses the process of capturing and 
analyzing network traffic as the main source of evidence available (Corey et al., 2002). Furthermore, network 
forensics can include a number of additional sources of evidence such as analysis of Intrusion Detection systems 
(IDS) and firewall logs, backtracking network packets and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connections 
and the collection of data from remote network services (Nikkel, 2005). However, since wireless networking is 
still an emerging technology, and due to the differences in available devices and the information they may 
contain, performing such procedures is difficult and constantly evolving. Moreover, in terms of network traffic 
acquisition, wireless forensics differs from network forensics in that the IEEE 802.11 standard defines a new 
Medium Access Control (MAC) specification for network communication between compatible devices (IEEE 
802.11 Std., 2007). Therefore, different methodologies and digital forensic procedures are needed to ensure that 
viable digital evidence is obtained from the investigation procedure.  
Wireless Network Sources of Evidence 
Previously conducted research in the field of wireless forensics has identified potential sources of evidence in 
wireless networks. Turnbull & Slay (2008) categorise potential evidence from 802.11 WLANs and associated 
devices as either Live or Post-Mortem sources of evidence. Live sources of evidence from WLANs involve the 
interception and capture of wireless network traffic, specifically 802.11 frames. Captured network traffic has 
been abstractly described as the preserved communication between multiple nodes on a network (Nikkel, 2006). 
However, network traffic presents challenges as a source of evidence as, generally, there is only one opportunity 
to capture data transmitted via the network and inadequate evidence collection systems result in irrecoverable 
losses (Casey, 2004). Consequently, reliable and tested systems must be used to aid in the collection of potential 
evidence from network traffic. In contrast, Post Mortem sources of evidence from wireless networks involve 
performing traditional computer forensic processes on embedded wireless devices and/or client’s wireless 
devices. For example, embedded wireless router systems and laptop clients. However, the type of information 
stored and how that information may be extracted is dependent on the type of device, the operating system used 
and how it is configured by the end-user (Turnbull & Slay, 2008). An example is the availability of specific log 
files and configuration settings. 
Proposed Network Forensic Models 
Various forensic models have been developed and tested in previous academic research, which involve the 
methodology of capturing and/or analysis of network traffic. Ngobeni & Venter (2009) proposed a theoretical 
Wireless Forensic Readiness Model (WFRM) which monitors wireless network traffic from various Access 
Points (AP). Logging functions are performed to ensure evidence preservation, thereby providing forensically 
sound evidence to be analyzed and reported should an incident occur. Additionally, it has been proposed that 
IDSs may also assist in digital forensic investigations. Although the main aim of IDSs is to aid detection of 
intrusions and to alert administrators, a possible further objective could be to supply evidence in civil or criminal 
legal proceedings (Sommer, 1999). Potential evidence is gathered and stored in IDS alert logs which may 
include basic event characteristics, possibly including date and time, source and destination addresses and 
network protocols used (Kent et al., 2006). These facts would provide forensic investigators with additional 
information relating to intrusion based events. Finally, Yim et al. (2008) conducted an investigation into the 
evidence collection of DoS attacks in a wireless network. A Forensic Profiling system is used based on wireless 
network traffic capture technique implemented on an existing AP using IDS methodologies to identify WLAN 
attacks. 
WIRELESS FORENSIC MODEL: SYSTEM DESIGN 
Information from available literature and the review of similar studies of academic research identified 
methodologies and procedures for conducting wireless forensic investigations. Due to the recognized lack of 
easily obtainable evidence from wireless devices, coupled with the difficulties of extracting such evidence, it can 
be concluded that network layer architectures designed to acquire and preserve network traffic have the potential 
to provide the availability of digital evidence to aid digital forensic investigations. However, as network traffic is 
a live source of evidence, forensic readiness principles would need to be applied so that potential evidence would 
be effectively obtained. 
The WFM is a digital forensic readiness system designed to perform acquisition and preservation of wireless 
network traffic as potential digital evidence. By using drones, the WFM design centers on the ability to passively 
intercept network traffic being communicated between wireless devices and subsequently preserves the collected 
data in a secure environment. Although the main goal of the WFM system design is to acquire and preserve 
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wireless network traffic, it was also important that the gathered data should adhere to digital forensic principles 
making it forensically sound and viable. Furthermore, the design system should also comprise of easily available 
open source software and hardware solutions. The following subsections specify these requirements and outline 
the system architecture, components and testing environment used in this research. 
System Architecture 
The system architecture includes two subsystems: the Wireless Drone and the Forensic Server. The Wireless 
Drone is a distributed network node which acquires wireless network traffic for a specific AP in a WLAN and 
forwards the collected data to a centralized Forensic Server for storage and preservation. The system architecture 
is designed to be implemented in an infrastructure based 802.11 wireless network with multiple APs, where each 
separate AP is monitored by a wireless drone. Furthermore, the WFM is comprised of external components from 
a WLAN infrastructure, thus allowing for ease of integration into an existing wireless network. Figure 1 displays 
the system architecture of the WFM, including the existing WLAN AP and STATION (STA) client, as well as a 
wireless attacker and FakeAP. 
Forensic Server






Figure 1.  Wireless Forensic Model System Architecture 
System Components 
The proposed system architecture of the WFM incorporates two subsystems in the overall system design; the 
Forensic Server and the Wireless Drone. The hardware configuration of the Forensic Server includes a PC 
equipped with an Intel Dual-Core processor, 4GB of Random Access Memory (RAM), and a Gigabyte Ethernet 
Network Interface Card (NIC). The hardware specifications were based on operating a single wireless drone in 
the testing environment. Additional wireless drones would increase the computational and network specifications 
due to increased data from the additional wireless drones. The software configuration of the Forensic Server 
consists of the Operating System (OS) and a wireless sniffing application. The Ubuntu Desktop Linux OS was 
implemented on the Forensic Server along with the Kismet wireless sniffer application. Kismet was chosen as 
the software provides 802.11 passive packet capture ability and a client/server architecture allowing remote 
packet capture sources (Kershaw, 2011). 
The hardware configuration of the Wireless Drone includes a wireless router with a wireless chipset which 
supports monitor mode for passive 802.11 frames packet capture. Additionally, the device should be equipped 
with Gigabyte Ethernet and a high power Central Processor Unit (CPU) to be capable of collecting and 
forwarding large portions of wireless network traffic. The software configuration of the Wireless Drone includes 
an embedded OS to run the wireless router and a wireless sniffer application to acquire wireless network traffic. 
The OpenWRT embedded Linux OS was used due to the ability to produce a highly customized firmware, and 
the Kismet application was used to acquire wireless network traffic.  
System Testing Environment 
In order to evaluate the capabilities of the proposed WFM a practical testing environment was proposed and 
implemented. It consisted of three separate entities: the WFM (including Forensic Server and Wireless Drone 
components), the existing WLAN (including an AP and wireless client STA) and, for the final stage of testing, 
 51 
 
an attacker to recreate common attacks mounted against WLANs. The existing WLAN infrastructure is 
comprised of a single AP and client STA. It was proposed that a consumer based wireless router was to be used 
as the AP, while the client STA would be a laptop computer with a wireless network adapter. The existing 
WLAN was configured to use the 802.11g standard, with Wi-Fi Protected Access version 2 Pre-Shared Key 
(WPA2-PSK) mode of network encryption. The final integral part of the testing environment is the attacker. It 
was proposed that the attacker component would be a laptop computer running the Backtrack 4 OS, designed 
specifically for computer and network penetration testing. The laptop was also configured with an external 
wireless adapter. 
WIRELESS FORENSIC MODEL TESTING 
In order to test the proposed WFM, the system design was required to be implemented by using the prescribed 
design features. The existing WLAN infrastructure was configured and benchmarked followed by 
implementation of the WFM into the testing environment. Benchmarking was also conducted to ascertain the 
capabilities of the WFM followed by recreation of WLAN attacks to determine the effectiveness of the system 
design. 
Existing WLAN Implementation & Benchmarking 
The first stage of testing involved the implementation of the testing environment based on the previously 
prescribed software and hardware requirements. The existing WLAN infrastructure, comprised of an AP and 
single client STA, was first implemented. Consumer available devices were used, a TP-Link wireless router 
(model TL—WR1043ND) was configured to operate as an AP using the prescribed 802.11g mode of operation. 
The AP was also configured to use WPA2-PSK network encryption. The client STA was implemented using an 
Apple MacBook (model 5,2) and the built-in AirPort Xtreme wireless adapter. The first step of benchmark 
testing was conducted to evaluate the capabilities of the implemented WLAN. The iPerf application was used to 
perform a bandwidth test between the AP and client STA. A total of 5 tests, run for 1 minute each, were 
conducted with an average result of 26.54Mbps aligning with real-world 802.11g bandwidth capabilities.  
A packet per second (PPS) benchmark test was then conducted to determine the existing WLAN packet 
transmission capabilities. The Multi-Generator (MGEN) application was used to generate TCP packet between 
WLAN devices. MGEN was used due to the ability to generate network traffic at specific rates, as well as 
extensive logging functionality to ensure correct packet generation rates (NRL, 2011). Three packet generation 
rates were tested, 2200, 3700 and 6000PPS, based on previous 802.11g wireless benchmarking research (Reddy, 
Sharma & Paulraj, 2008). Again, each test was conducted 5 times to ensure consistent results. Table 1 displays 
the findings from testing. It was found that the existing WLAN was capable of maintaining a maximum packet 
rate of approximately 3700PPS without suffering time delay in packet transmission. 
 










2200PPS 128942.2 59.90 2152.68 
3700PPS 220412.4 59.82 3684.29 
6000PPS 357111.2 91.66 3896.84 
 
The findings from benchmark testing provided a baseline performance measurement of the implemented WLAN. 
Performing benchmark testing was essential as it presented insight into the capabilities of the wireless network 
while also providing assurance of future results from the WFM testing. 
WFM Implementation & Benchmarking 
The WFM was implemented into the existing WLAN infrastructure based on the proposed system architecture 
and components. The first step of implementation involved performing initial testing on the Wireless Drone and 
Forensic Server components with the prescribed hardware and software configurations. The Wireless Drone first 
required a hardware platform based on a wireless router. Due to the difficulty in identifying a specific device 
based on the system design requirements, various consumer available wireless routers were informally tested to 
ascertain potential solutions. During such testing a stable version of OpenWRT firmware was installed and 
packet capture capabilities tested. This initial testing revealed the importance of the hardware specifications such 
as CPU network link speed. Eventually, the Ubiquiti RouterStation Pro was chosen as the desired hardware 
platform because the device was designed to run OpenWRT. It also has Gigabyte Ethernet and the ability to 
operate multiple mini-PCI wireless adapters. 
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Final implementation of the Wireless Drone involved equipping the RouterStation Pro with dual Ubiquiti 
XtremeRange2 (XR2) wireless mini-PCI wireless adapters. A customized OpenWRT firmware was compiled 
from development source code using the OpenWRT build environment. The open source ath5k wireless drivers 
were used which are available with the new generation mac80211 wireless framework. Kismet (version 2010-07-
R1) was also included in the firmware build and configured to operate as a drone forwarding collected wireless 
network traffic to the Forensic Server. The Forensic Server was then implemented. A PC with Gigabyte Ethernet 
was installed with Ubuntu Desktop Linux OS and Kismet (version 2010-07-R1). Packet capture support was 
added using libpcap (version 0.8). Kismet was configured to operate in server mode to collect and store all 
network traffic defined by the available sources. Other minor customizations were made including implementing 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) on the Forensic Server to enable synchronization of time between WFM devices. 
Preservation of acquired evidence was manually conducted by hashing the log files produced by Kismet. The 
md5sum tool was used to produce a unique Message Digest algorithm 5 (MD5) value. The log files were then 
stored on two separate partitions and mounted as read-only for data analysis. 
 
Benchmark testing involved establishing the capabilities of the implemented WFM and measuring the bandwidth 
between devices. The Gigabyte network link was tested between the Forensic Server and Wireless Drone, 
finding an average bandwidth of 286.4Mbps. It illustrated the ability of the implemented system to handle the 
maximum traffic of the existing WLAN rate (26.54 Mbps) needed to be forwarded after collection by the 
Wireless Drone. The WFM was then benchmarked using the MGEN application and the same testing 
methodology at that to measure the PPS capabilities of the existing WLAN. Each TCP packet generated by 
MGEN was encased in an 802.11 data frame and sent from the AP to client STA on the existing WLAN.  The 
benchmark testing was conducted at 2200 and 3700PPS with single and dual wireless adapters operating in the 
Wireless Drone. Again, each test was conducted 5 times to ensure consistent results were obtained. However, the 
test duration was extended to 5 minutes in order to ensure the WFM could handle extended periods of maximum 
wireless network traffic rates. 
 
Data analysis of packet capture files was conducted using the Wireshark application and a number of 802.11 
filtering rules built-in to the application. Wireshark was also used to decrypt the WPA2-PSK encrypted wireless 
network traffic. Decrypting was possible by capturing the 4-way handshake between AP and client STA initiated 
at the start of each benchmark test. The total number of acquired network packets was compared to the MGEN 
packet generation log and statistical percentages calculated. Table 2 displays the findings from the WFM 
benchmark testing. Acquisition results were based on the total number of frames generated by the MGEN 
application versus the total number of frames acquired by the WFM. The findings show that the WFM was 
capable of acquiring a high percentage of wireless network traffic; almost 100% of all data frames generated at 
2200PPS and approximately 91% of all data frames with single or dual wireless adapters, operating at the 
maximum packet transmission speed of the existing WLAN (at 3700PPS). In addition to analysis of the 
generated data frames, acknowledgement frames were also analysed in regards to acquisition capabilities. It can 
be deduced that an acknowledgement frame is generated for every data frame sent over the network. Therefore, 
at 2200PPS or 3700PPS generation rates, the actual number of frames sent over the network is 4400PPS and 
7400PPS respectively. However, no logging was available to ensure the number of acknowledgement frames 
generated. Instead, the results are based on the number of data frames generated. The results show a dramatic 
drop in frame acquisition capability for acknowledgement frame acquisition at 3700PPS; approximately 56% 
and 50% for single and dual wireless adapters respectively. 
 
Table 2. Benchmark Acquisition Results 
 
Frame Type Number of Wireless Adapters 2200PPS 3700PPS 
Data Frame 1 100% 92.19% 2 99.70% 90.35% 
Acknowledgement 
Frame 
1 99.99% 56.43% 
2 99.40% 49.97% 
WFM: Evidence Collection of Recreated Attacks 
In order to evaluate the capabilities of the WFM to produce reliable evidence of WLAN attacks, two different 
groups of attacks were recreated and targeted against the existing WLAN infrastructure. Denial of Service (DoS) 
and Fake AP attacks were conducted, with two types in each group, and the WFM configured to collect the 
wireless network traffic as evidence. Furthermore, the Kismet IDS located on the Forensic Server was also 
configured to produce alerts based on the built-in intrusion rules provided with the application. Moreover, the 
Wireless Drone was configured to utilize both wireless adapters to monitor multiple channels during the 
recreated WLAN attacks in order to try and obtain more information and evidence of the conducted attack. The 
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first adapter was configured to monitor the AP channel, while the second adapter was configured to ‘hop’ 
between the remaining available channels in the 2.4GHz ISM band. With reference to the DoS attacker, two 
types of attacks were recreated. These were a deauthentication flood attack using the aireplay-ng tool available 
with the aircrack-ng suite (aircrack-ng, 2011), and an authentication flood attack using the mdk3 tool (Larbig, 
2011).   Both attacks flood the network with forged 802.11 frames attempting to disturb authorized network 
communication between WLAN devices by congesting the wireless network. 
 
Table 3. Attack acquisition Results. 
 
Attack Type 
Number of DoS 
frames 
generated 












300290.2 299873.2 99.86% 
 
The DoS attacks were both conducted from the attacker’s computer targeted against the AP and client STA in 
the existing WLAN. The results of the recreated DoS attacks are displayed in Table 3. Again, each test was 
conducted 5 times, again over a period of 5 minutes. The second group of recreated attacks were Fake AP attacks 
launched against the existing WLAN infrastructure. The first type was a beacon flood attack, generated using the 
mdk3 tool and flooding forged beacon frames on a specific channel. Next, an infrastructure Fake AP attack was 
conducted using airbase-ng, providing a WLAN infrastructure for devices, enticing them to connect to the 
illegitimate wireless network. Each attack was once more conducted from the attacker’s computer, specifically 
targeting the existing WLAN devices, and conducted 5 separate times over a 5 minute duration to ensure 
consistent results. The results of the WFM acquisition of Fake AP attacks are displayed in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Recreated Fake AP Attacks. 
 
Attack Type 
Number of Fake 
AP frames 
generated 
Number of Fake 
AP frames 








6333.2 3938.4 62.19% 
 
The findings from the recreated WLAN attacks illustrate the ability to obtain evidence from network events. The 
WFM was able to acquire an exceptionally high percentage of the recreated DoS attack traffic, though the 
acquisition percentage of the Fake AP attacks was a lot lower; approximately 62% and 66% for each test 
conducted. A lower acquisition rate from Fake AP attacks was caused by the attack occurring on a different 
channel from the AP channel. However, additional frames were collected by the wireless adapter configured to 
hop between the available channels. In terms of the evidence collected, the WFM was able to acquire and 
preserve 802.11 frames injected by the attacker from each recreated attack. Each frame contained information 
regarding the attack, such as source MAC address, frame type, timestamp and sequence number. However, the 
Kismet IDS proved inadequate at detecting network intrusions, being only able to detect one of the four attacks, 
the mdk3 beacon flood attack, which raised the APSPOOF alert based on Service Set Identifier (SSID) naming 
convention and a list of authorized MAC addresses. 
CONCLUSION 
The conducted testing phases reported significant findings regarding the capabilities of the WFM system design. 
The benchmark testing revealed that the WFM was capable of acquiring a large proportion of the maximum 
packet generation rates of the existing WLAN. Therefore, the system design implemented in the existing WLAN 
provided assurance of acquiring and preserving a high percentage of wireless network traffic. However, due to 
the nature of wireless networks using the airwaves as a transportation medium, a complete data set is 
unobtainable. Nevertheless, the configuration of the WFM shows that correct implementation of a system design 





In terms of the recreated attacks, the WFM was again capable of acquiring and preserving evidence of the attacks 
conducted against the existing WLAN. Although digital evidence of the recreated attacks was able to be 
acquired, there still exist potential issues with the evidence collected. This is especially true in the case of Media 
Access Control (MAC) address spoofing. The unique MAC address is an exceptionally important piece of 
information in wireless forensics as it links the wireless network traffic to a unique device. However, it continues 
to be difficult for a forensic investigator to link the collected evidence to an attacker’s device (wireless network 
adapter) in the case where MAC spoofing is implemented. Furthermore, MAC address spoofing is built-in to 
many WLAN attack tools as a needed command parameter, thus providing the attacker assurance of anonymity 
when injecting forged 802.11 frames. 
 
In terms of the WFM system design, the practical implementation demonstrated that a digital forensic readiness 
model is able to be constructed using readily available hardware and software. The Kismet application formed 
the backbone of the WFM software configuration and proved reliable at acquiring and preserving wireless 
network traffic in the packet capture file format. However, the IDS functionality lacks significant capabilities in 
terms of detecting wireless attacks. A number of potential issues surrounding the WFM system design such as 
attack detection capabilities, data loss and the effect of monitoring a large scale WLAN with multiple APs. 
Nevertheless, the proposed WFM presents a practical system design able to acquire wireless network traffic from 
a live source of evidence providing preserved evidence for examination and analysis in Digital Forensic 
investigations. 
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